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SEC V. BAUER: IF THE GLOVE FITS, IT’S INSIDER
TRADING
Kramer Ortman+
“Insider trading is one of the few issues in securities regulation that has
become a matter of cultural symbolism as well as legal controversy.”1 The
public and the media are often captivated by stories of large-scale insider trading
and corporate fraud schemes.2 However, the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently dedicated itself to cracking down on
such fraud, regardless of the size.3 Through this increased effort, the SEC is
bringing insider trading claims under factual scenarios that highlight fraudulent
activity in the evolving financial world, despite not exactly fitting the molds
established by precedent.4 A federal court, in SEC v. Bauer, explored, but left
unresolved, the threshold issue of whether the theories of insider trading may be
used to impose liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
+
J.D. and Securities Law Program Certificate Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of
America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 2011, Gonzaga University. The author would like to
thank Professor David A. Lipton for his invaluable expertise and suggestions throughout the writing
process. He would also like to thank his wife, Sydney, for her constant love and support and his
parents, Chet and Jenny, for their encouragement and guidance. Finally, he would like to thank the
members of the Catholic University Law Review for their help with this Note.
1. 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT &
PREVENTION § 1.1 (2013).
2. See Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 181, 181
(2006) (stating that despite the public’s typically fluctuating interest in insider trading, recent events
have recaptured the public’s attention due to the prominent corporations and individuals involved,
such as the Enron debacle and the Martha Stewart scandal); see also Peter S. Goodman, Insider
Trading: ‘Steal A Lot, They Make you King’, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffington
post.com/2010/11/22/insider-trading_n_786969.html (last updated May 5, 2011, 2:59 PM) (stating
that the Bernie Madoff case attracted vast public interest because the nation could easily identify
the wrongdoer with the financial crisis); see also Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Div. of
Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission 2008 Summer School: U.S. Experience of Insider Trading Enforcement
(Feb. 19, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch021908lct.htm)
(arguing that the public’s fascination with insider trading stems from the desire to understand what
occurrence or characteristic, aside from greed, led successful, hard-working businessmen and
women to commit such grandiose crimes).
3. See SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last modified Oct. 25,
2013) (explaining that insider trading violations remain a high priority for the SEC’s enforcement
division). The SEC brought fifty-eight insider trading actions in the fiscal year 2012. Id. In the
three-year span from 2009 to 2012, the SEC filed 168 insider trading actions, which amounts to
more actions than in any previous three-year period. Id.
4. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659–60 (1997) (endorsing the
misappropriation theory of insider trading to comport to the alleged fraudulent activity even though
that activity would not constitute insider trading under prior Supreme Court case law).
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1934 (the Exchange Act) in connection with the redemption of mutual fund
shares for the first time.5
Insider trading is the “purchase or sale of securities, with scienter (or guilty
knowledge), while in possession of material, non-public information in breach
of a duty arising out of a fiduciary relationship.”6 Although insider trading is
not explicitly proscribed in the statutes relating to general securities law,7 the
underlying elements in all insider trading offenses are (1) the use of any
“manipulative or deceptive device,” (2) “in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security,” in contravention of rules promulgated by the SEC.8 The courts
and the government have developed two prosecutorial theories of insider trading
to determine guilt that include these elements.9
The two theories of insider trading liability are the “classical theory” and the
“misappropriation theory.”10 The classical theory describes a violation of
insider trading laws by corporate insiders11 who trade in their corporation’s own
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information.12 In contrast, the
misappropriation theory describes a violation by persons, generally corporate
outsiders, who misappropriate securities trading information given to them in
trust by the source of the information.13 These theories represent two possible
fact patterns that establish a basis for insider trading causes of action.14

5. SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 769 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that no federal court has ruled
on the issue whether traditional insider trading theories apply to mutual fund redemptions).
6. Thomsen, supra note 2.
7. See Randall W. Quinn, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading in the Supreme
Court: A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L., 865, 868 (2003) (discussing how section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is the only
federal securities provision expressly prohibiting insider trading). See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012)
(requiring corporate insiders to return profits made through certain trades within a six month
period); see also RALPH C. FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY & HERBERT THOMAS, FERRARA ON
INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL § 1.02 [1][a] (2010) (describing section 16(b) as restricting
corporate insiders from unfairly benefiting from “short swing” trading profits).
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)).
9. Quinn, supra note 7, at 869 (defining both the classical theory and misappropriation
theory used to prosecute insider trading).
10. Id.
11. “Corporate insider” has commonly been defined to include “officers, directors, or
controlling stockholders.” Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638,
at *3 (Nov. 8, 1961). However, the application of the classical theory has been extended to include,
aside from traditional corporate insiders, any actors who hold momentary fiduciary duties to a
corporation, such as attorneys or consultants. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997)
(citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983)).
12. See infra Part I.B.1 (tracking the development of the classical theory through case law).
13. See infra Part I.B.2 (describing the creation of the misappropriation theory).
14. See infra Parts I.B.1–2 (examining the fact patterns of cases charged using both insider
trading theories).
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In Bauer, the SEC struggled to apply either theory to the facts of the case.15
Bauer arose after the SEC questioned the redemption of mutual fund shares by
an account executive.16 Claiming that the redemption violated insider trading
laws, the SEC pursued legal action against Jilaine H. Bauer.17 The SEC
originally won summary judgment, but dropped its classical theory liability
argument on appeal, in favor of the alternative misappropriation theory.18
Although the Seventh Circuit expressed some skepticism regarding the
applicability of the misappropriation theory to the mutual fund context, the court
did not outright reject the possibility that the SEC may utilize section 10(b) in
this context.19
This Note examines the novel issue of whether insider trading law can apply
to a mutual fund executive who, with approval for the trade, redeems shares
within the fund during an open trading window period. First, this Note
summarizes the relevant prior history of insider trading and then provides a
background of Bauer. After establishing these bases, this Note analyzes the
application of insider trading law to Bauer. Then, this Note first argues that the
misappropriation theory applies within the context of redeeming shares in a
mutual fund. Second, it argues that the SEC can prove Bauer’s guilt using the
necessary elements of insider trading theory.
I. INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY, THE “ANTI-FRAUD” PROVISIONS OF
SECURITIES LAW, AND FURTHER CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT
A. The Statutory Basis for Insider Trading and the “Anti-Fraud” Provisions
Although no statutes specifically proscribe insider trading in the United
States, the primary statutory and regulatory bases for barring such conduct are
“the ‘anti-fraud’ provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, . .
. Rule 10b-5 issued under that Act, and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of

15. See infra note 18 and accompanying text (citing the change in theory used by the
prosecution to convict Bauer).
16. SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2013).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 767, 769–70.
19. Id. at 772.

1078

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:1075

1933.”20 Section 10(b)21 and Rule 10b-522 prohibit fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.23 Specifically, Section 10(b) outlaws the use of
any deceptive device to buy or sell securities.24 Adopted by the SEC pursuant
to its rulemaking power under section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful to
“employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”25 Additionally, the SEC
can also bring charges for insider trading based on Section 17(a).26 Whereas
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply to situations involving a security’s
“purchase or sale,”27 Section 17(a) prohibits fraud in the “offer or sale of any
securities.”28

20. Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *1 (Nov. 8,
1961).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). Section 10(b) states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or
any securities-based swap agreement any manipulative device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). Rule 10b-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
23. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012). Section 17(a) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).

2014]

If the Glove Fits, It's Insider Trading

1079

B. Common Law Development of Insider Trading Law in the United States
Insider trading law further developed through judicial interpretation of the
anti-fraud provisions.29 Courts generally interpret these provisions to require
deceptive conduct in order to find an insider trading violation.30
The preeminent authority interpreting the anti-fraud provisions is In the
Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.31 In that case, the SEC found willful violations
of the anti-fraud provisions when a broker-dealer and his firm sold securities
based upon undisclosed information obtained from the director of the issuer,
who was also an associate in the firm.32 The SEC held that corporate insiders
have two options when trading in shares of their own corporation.33 The
corporate insiders must either disclose all personally-known material
information prior to conducting such trades or abstain from trading.34 Cady,
Roberts also imposed a duty to disclose upon insiders with respect to both
purchasing and selling the corporation’s shares.35
1. The Classical Theory
The Supreme Court continued the statutory interpretation debate and endorsed
the classical theory of insider trading in Chiarella v. United States.36 Under the
classical theory, a corporate insider violates the anti-fraud provisions by trading
in the corporation’s securities “on the basis of material, non-public information”

29. See Ted Kamman & Rory T. Hood, With the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis, Regulatory
Loopholes, and Hedge Funds, How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the Insider Trading Laws?,
2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 357, 363–64 (2009) (stating that case analysis and application of insider
trading laws exemplifies the common law development of legal theory); see also Donna M. Nagy,
Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1322–23
(2009) (explaining that courts play a critical role in defining the law of insider trading in the United
States, due to the absence of a statute specifically banning insider trading).
30. Nagy, supra note 29, at 1322–23.
31. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *3 (Nov.
8, 1961) (noting that the legislators enacted securities laws to ensure honesty and transparency in
the purchase and sale of securities); see also Joseph J. Humke, Comment, The Misappropriation
Theory of Insider Trading: Outside the Lines of Section 10(b), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 819, 824 (1997)
(noting the significance of the Cady decision).
32. Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 60638, at *1–2.
33. Id. at *3.
34. Id. This obligation arises from the duty to disclose typically reserved for corporate
insiders, such as directors or stockholders, which requires disclosing material information. Id.
Courts have generally held that “insiders must disclose all material facts which are known to them
by virtue of their position but which are not to known to persons with whom they deal and which,
if known, would affect their investment judgment.” Id. See also Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 227–29 (1980) (expanding upon the common law rationale for this obligation).
35. Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 60638, at *3 (stating that investors who buy shares from
corporate insiders are entitled to the same protections that require insiders to disclose special
information in their possession, as those who sell shares to the insiders).
36. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230, 234–35 (rejecting a broad statutory interpretation that would
include corporate outsiders in those groups with fiduciary duties to the corporation).
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about the corporation.37 In Chiarella, the Supreme Court imposed this
requirement specifically on corporate insiders.38 The Court held that Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 did not impose a duty to disclose on those individuals who
possessed material, nonpublic information.39 However, the Court found that the
fiduciary duties that corporate insiders owe to the corporation and its
shareholders included the duty to either disclose all such information prior to
trading or abstain from trading in the company’s stock.40
Although Chiarella established this duty for corporate insiders, the Court
exempted traders that owed no fiduciary duties to the corporation or its
shareholders from liability.41 The defendant, in Chiarella, was neither a
corporate officer nor an employee of the company whose shares were traded.42
Rather, Chiarella was an employee of a company hired to print five
announcements of various corporate takeover bids.43 Despite the masked
identity of the companies involved within the documents given to the printer,
Chiarella managed to decipher the identity of the “target companies” from
additional information contained within the documents.44 After acquiring this
information, but before the announcements were printed, Chiarella bought stock
in the target companies.45 Chiarella later sold the shares after the corporate
takeover bids were publicized and made a profit of roughly $30,000.46
The Court rejected the notion that there was “a general duty between all
participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
information.”47 Therefore, the Court held that Chiarella had not violated any
securities laws under the classical theory of insider trading.48 The Court
restricted the scope of insider trading liability to situations where the insider had
“a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between

37. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997).
38. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–29. The court stated:
[T]he duty to disclose arises when one party has information that the other party is
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
between them. . . . [A] relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between the
shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential
information by reason of their position with that corporation. This relationship gives rise
to a duty to disclose because of the necessity of preventing a corporate insider from . . .
taking unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (original alterations omitted).
39. FERRARA, supra note 7, at § 2.02 [3].
40. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227; see also Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 60638, at *3.
41. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232.
42. Id. at 231.
43. Id. at 224.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 233 (giving the Court’s reasoning for rejecting the petitioner’s arguments).
48. Id. at 235.
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parties to a transaction,” such as that held by corporate officers, directors, and
shareholders.49
However, since Chiarella, the duty to disclose or abstain under the classical
theory of insider trading is no longer limited to traditional corporate insiders,
such as officers and directors. The Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC,50 in dicta,
extended this duty to outsiders who can obtain status as “temporary insiders.”51
This theory extends insider trading liability to outsiders “clothe[d] . . . with
temporary insider status when the outsider obtains access to confidential
information solely for corporate purposes in the context of a special confidential
relationship.”52 Because of this corollary status, the temporary insider acquires
a fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its shareholders.53 Because a duty
exists in these situations, the temporary insider can be held liable under the
classical theory of insider trading.54
2. The Misappropriation Theory
The Supreme Court endorsed a second theory to attach insider trading liability
in United States v. O’Hagan: the misappropriation theory.55 According to the
misappropriation theory, a person violates the anti-fraud provisions by

49. Id. at 230. The Court refused to entertain the notion of the misappropriation theory
because the SEC only presented it on appeal, just like in Bauer. See Counterattack From the
Supreme Court: Chiarella v. United States, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/counterAttack_b.php (last visited June 7, 2014)
(“[Justice] Powell discovered that this ‘misappropriation’ argument had not been presented to the
jury, and he persuaded the Supreme Court to refuse to consider the theory in the case.”).
50. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). See infra Part 1.B.3 (exploring tipper-tippee liability).
51. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655, n.14 (establishing the parameters of the temporary insider’s role);
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (noting the influence of the
Dirks decision).
52. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 565 (internal quotations omitted).
53. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed
legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the
corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for
recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic
corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes. . . . For such a duty to be imposed, however,
the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information
confidential, and the relationship at least must imply such a duty.
Id. See also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (explaining that a temporary
fiduciary duty may extend to outside service providers).
54. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
55. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). Although O’Hagan endorsed the misappropriation theory, the
theory existed as an avenue to insider trading violations long before 1997. See Kamman & Hood,
supra note 29, at 374 n.39 (stating that the origins of the misappropriation theory go as far back as
the dissent in Chiarella, after which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
endorsed the theory).
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misappropriating confidential information for securities trading purposes, in
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. Under this theory, a
fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase
or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the
principal of the exclusive use of that information.56
Whereas the classical theory imposes a duty upon corporate insiders, the
misappropriation theory imposes a duty upon corporate “outsiders.”57 Thus, the
misappropriation theory protects against abuses by outsiders, who owe no
fiduciary duty to the corporation, from using confidential information to profit
from changes in stock prices.58 The breach can occur at a different time than the
actual trade, as long as it somehow relates to the trade.59
In O’Hagan, an attorney purchased common stock and call options of a
potential takeover target based upon nonpublic information.60 O’Hagan learned
of the potential takeover from confidential information obtained through his law
firm, which represented the company planning the tender offer.61 Because
O’Hagan was neither an officer nor had any relation the target company, the
classical theory of insider trading did not apply.62 The Court nevertheless held
that O’Hagan was guilty of insider trading, because he owed a fiduciary duty to
his law firm, and when he used his law firm’s confidential information to trade,
56. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (citation omitted).
57. See id., 521 U.S. at 652–53 (stating that the misappropriation theory “outlaws trading on
the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate ‘outsider’ in breach of a duty owed not to a
trading party, but to the source of the information”).
58. See id. at 653. The SEC issued Rule 10b5-2 to identify some of the circumstances under
which a duty of trust or confidence arises such that its breach would constitute a misappropriation
of confidential information. These circumstances include:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the
person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing
confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know
that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the
recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or
her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or
obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed
with respect to the information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor reasonably
should have known that the person who was the source of the information expected that
the person would keep the information confidential, because of the parties’ history,
pattern, or practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there was no
agreement or understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2013).
59. The anti-fraud provisions make no mention of any time limitation imposed on acquiring
the material nonpublic information and the purchase or sale of a security while using that
information. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a) (2012), 78j(b) (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
60. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 653 n.5.
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he misappropriated such information.63 Therefore, the Court held that a
corporate outsider is guilty of insider trading in connection with securities “when
he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information,” rather than to
the persons with whom he trades.64
3. Tipper-Tippee Liability
Without establishing a new theory of insider trading, the Court expanded the
concept of liable parties under the current theories of insider trading through
“tipper-tippee” liability.65 Insider trading is not limited to corporate insiders
who personally trade in securities based upon any inside information that they
have acquired through normal fiduciary means.66 Under “tipper-tippee”
liability, a corporate insider may be found guilty of insider trading by passing
along inside information and “tipping” others to trade on the basis of this
information.67 If the “tippee” trades on such information, knowing that the
tipper’s disclosure of such information breaches a duty, then the tippee also
violates federal securities laws.68
The Supreme Court illustrated this theory in Dirks v. SEC.69 In Dirks, the
Court addressed the issue of insider trading in the case of a securities analyst
who received troubling information about a corporation and shared it with
investors.70 The former insider, Ron Secrist, had been employed by a life
insurance company controlled by Equity Funding Life Insurance Corp.71
Dismayed at what he believed to be massive fraud by his former employer, he
contacted Dirks, an analyst who specialized in insurance companies.72 Secrist
did not have direct evidence for his allegations, but Dirks was impressed enough
to conduct his own inquiries.73 Dirks, in turn, found sufficient support for

63. Id. at 653–54, 666.
64. Id. at 652.
65. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (noting that tippees take on fiduciary duties
based on confidential information they occasionally learn through inappropriate channels, which
bars them from trading on such information).
66. See id. (stating that tippees receiving information from an insider take on the insider’s
duty to the corporation and the shareholders).
67. See id. at 659–60 (observing that corporate insiders may not give information to
outsiders).
68. See id. at 659–60, 664 (stating that “the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or abstain”).
69. Id. at 659–64 (discussing the potential liability of recipients of confidential information
for trading on that information).
70. Id. at 648–49.
71. Id. at 649.
72. Id. at 648–49.
73. Id. at 649.
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Secrist’s claims of fraud and Dirks’ findings ultimately reached the SEC.74 In
addition, he discussed his findings with various clients, some of whom traded
on the information.75 The SEC brought charges against Dirks and some of
Equity Funding’s insiders.76 Dirks appealed.77
In Dirks, the Court articulated the general rule of law for “tipper-tippee”
liability: “Not only are insiders forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from
personally using undisclosed corporate information to their advantage, but they
also may not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose
of exploiting the information for their personal gain.”78 Accordingly, the Court
found that the non-insider tippee “assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders
of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information . . . when the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the
information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has
been a breach.”79 However, in order for a tippee to be found guilty of insider
trading, the insider who passed along the information must “benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure.”80
The Court, applying the tipper-tippee rule of law to the facts of Dirks, found
that the insider who provided Dirks the information did not benefit from the
disclosure.81 Rather, the insider disclosed the confidential information in order
to expose apparent fraud within the company.82 Because the insider did not
“benefit, directly or indirectly from his disclosure,”83 the Court held that the

74. Id. at 649–50 (stating that after Dirks spread the word of his findings, particularly through
contacting newspapers, and after the stock price fell over forty percent, the SEC began to investigate
Equity Funding and, ultimately, Dirks).
75. Id. at 649.
76. Id. at 650–52 (recognizing Dirks’ key role in unveiling the fraud and bringing reduced
charges as a result).
77. Id. at 652.
78. Id. at 659 (explaining the need to attach liability to tipper-tippee trading).
79. Id. at 660. The Court further explained that a tippee’s responsibility requires that the
tippee knew that the confidential information that the tippee received violated an assumed fiduciary
duty. Id. at 661 (quoting In re Investors Mgmt. Co., Securities Act Release No. 9267, 44 S.E.C
633, 651 (1971)).
80. Id. at 662 (establishing the test for liability in tipper-tippee trading cases).
81. Id. at 666–67 & n.27 (deciding that no breach of fiduciary duty to the company’s
shareholders existed).
82. Id. (finding that the insider’s intent in sharing information with Dirks was to reveal fraud,
not to perpetuate fraudulent investments).
83. See id. at 662, 666 n.27.
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insider had not breached a duty to the company’s shareholders.84 Therefore, the
Court decided that the tippee could not be held liable for insider trading.85
C. The Necessary Elements of Insider Trading
1. Scienter
Regardless of the applicable insider trading theory, a violation of insider
trading laws requires that a person act with scienter.86 Scienter is defined as “a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”87
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,88 the Supreme Court considered the requisite
state of mind required to prove civil liability under Rule 10b-5.89 In this case,
the president of a bank engaged in a fraudulent investment scheme that involved
his conversion of customer funds for personal use.90 The accounting firm, Ernst
& Ernst, was accused of negligence with regard to its auditing duties to the
bank.91 The Court found that the negligence claims could not support liability
because Section 10(b) requires intentionality in order to establish scienter.92 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the “manipulative or deceptive”
language used with “device or contrivance” in Section 10(b), strongly suggested

84. See id. at 666 (stating that the insiders breached no duty to shareholders). The Court
decided Dirks under the classical theory of insider trading. See id. at 657–59 (discussing in detail
the application of the classical theory as developed by Chiarella); see also supra Part I.B.1 (tracking
the development and definition of the classical theory). A person could also theoretically “tip”
another person based on misappropriated information. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on
whether the Dirks principles apply to trading based on the misappropriation theory. See FERRARA,
supra note 7, at § 2.02 [6][D][iv] (stating that in O’Hagan, the Court did not decide whether the
misappropriation theory applied to a tip based on misappropriated information). On the other hand,
the lower courts have not hesitated to find tipping liability in misappropriation cases. See id.
However, there is a split over whether the requirement of a personal benefit to the tipper applies
within this theory. Compare SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (requiring the SEC
to prove that one who misappropriated the information expected to benefit from the tip), with SEC
v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that liability under the
misappropriation theory does not require that the tipper benefit from the tip).
85. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666.
86. In Aaron v. SEC, the Supreme Court decided whether the SEC needed to establish scienter
as an element of an enforcement action brought under the federal securities laws anti-fraud
provisions. 446 U.S. 680, 686 (1980). Based on the statutory language and the legislative history,
the Court found that those bringing claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must prove scienter
regardless of the plaintiff and relief sought. Id. at 691.
87. Id. at 686 n.5 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 & n.12 (1976))
(discussing whether plaintiffs may bring claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without
establishing scienter).
88. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
89. Id. at 187–88.
90. Id. at 189.
91. Id.
92. Id. See also Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1043–44 (7th Cir. 1977)
(stating that negligence does not give rise to a Section 10(b) claim).
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that Congress intended the statute to require knowing or intentional
misconduct.93
Although the Supreme Court determined that the anti-fraud provisions
required some form of intentionality to prove the element of scienter,94 what
form the intent must take remains unclear.95 The Court has not answered this
question, but lower courts overwhelmingly say that recklessness is sufficient to
prove scienter.96 However, many of these courts continue to hold that
recklessness entails a subjective aspect related to purposefully avoiding the
truth.97
Courts in the Seventh Circuit have interpreted intentionality to include
recklessness.98 In Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.,99 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that “a reckless omission
of material facts upon which the plaintiff put justifiable reliance in connection
with a sale or purchase of securities is actionable under Section 10(b) as fleshed
out by Rule 10b-5.”100 The court, in Sundstrand, defined recklessness as:
[A] highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or
even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading
buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious
that the actor must have been aware of it.101

93. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197 (explaining that the words are not ambiguous, but
necessitate that the statute must be read to require intent).
94. See id. at 189.
95. See Donald C. Langevoort, What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the Scienter
Requirement, 3 (Georgetown Publ. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 12-111, 2012),
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2018&context=
facpub (noting the lack of clarity over the meaning of intentionality and discussing whether
recklessness is sufficient).
96. Id. at 3–4. See also WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING, §
4.4.2 (1996) (discussing the requirements to prove scienter under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
The Supreme Court has noted that all lower courts find scienter present with intentionality and
recklessness, but that the level of recklessness required differs depending on the circuit. Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007). In Tellabs, the degree of
recklessness necessary to satisfy the scienter requirement was not presented for the Supreme Court
to decide. Id.
97. Langevoort, supra note 95, at 3–4.
98. See e.g., SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 775 (7th Cir. 2013). Bauer’s case is being
prosecuted in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. As such, its case law
governing the required elements of insider trading governs the application of insider trading to
Bauer.
99. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
100. Id. at 1044.
101. Id. at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D.
Okla. 1976) vacated by Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 864 (10th Cir.
1980)). The Seventh Circuit’s definition of recklessness is the one most commonly followed across
the jurisdictions. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
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The court analogized fraud under Rule 10b-5 to common law fraud to reach
the conclusion that recklessness was sufficient to establish a cause of action.102
According to the Seventh Circuit, “[a]t common law reckless behavior was
sufficient to support causes of action sounding in fraud or deceit,” therefore, “it
would be highly inappropriate to construe the Rule 10b-5 remedy to be more
restrictive than its common law analogs.”103
2. Materiality
Because the anti-fraud provisions prohibit the use of “any untrue statement of
a material fact” or the exclusion of “a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made . . . not misleading,”104 materiality is a frequently disputed
element discussed in insider trading cases.105 The Supreme Court entered the
debate about the definition of materiality for the purposes of Rule 10b-5 in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson.106 In Basic, former employees of Basic sued the company
claiming Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations after they sold their company
shares at exaggeratedly low prices in a market where Basic’s misleading
statements kept the stock price depressed.107 The claimants argued that Basic
violated the anti-fraud provisions by repeatedly claiming that they were not
privy to merger negotiations, when in fact a merger was developing during this
time.108 Less than two months after Basic’s last statement denying a merger,
Basic merged with another company and announced the deal the following
day.109
In assessing whether the denial of discussions related to a possible merger was
material within the context of federal securities laws, the Court stated that
information is deemed material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor
as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”110
The Court found no valid reason to exclude discussions concerning possible
REGULATION 843 (3d ed. 1995); see also 141 CONG. REC. 7245 (1995) (statement of Rep. Blilely)
(stating the importance of the Sundstrand definition of recklessness).
102. Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1044.
103. Id.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
105. See e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226 (1987) (discussing the materiality
requirement).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 228.
108. Id. at 227–28. In three separate statements following heavy days of trading of Basic stock
and inquiries into the matter, Basic denied that it had knowledge of any forthcoming business
developments that could explain the stock activity. See id. at 227 n.4 (stating that the company did
not know of any events that would affect its trading activity).
109. Id. at 227–28. Basic’s last statement denying a possible merger was issued to its
shareholders on November 6, 1978. Id. at 227–28 n.4. The merger deal was endorsed by Basic on
December 19, 1978. Id. at 228.
110. Id. at 231–32 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
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mergers, but it did not develop a bright-line rule for assessing materiality.111
Rather, the Court held that “[a]ny approach that designates a single fact or
occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such
as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.”112 As such,
materiality includes a subjective and objective assessment.113
3. “On the Basis of”
Another element required for insider trading is that the person charged must
trade in reliance on, or “on the basis” of, material, nonpublic information.114
Under Rule 10b5-1, this requirement is met if the person trading was aware of
the material, nonpublic information.115 However, the rule also sets forth several
affirmative defenses or exceptions to liability.116 Rule 10b5-1 allows persons to
trade in certain, specified circumstances where it is clear that the information
111. Id. at 236 (stating that although a bright-line rule may be easier to follow and to apply,
“ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts and
Congress’ policy decisions”).
112. Id.; see also TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450 (stating that “[t]he determination [of materiality]
requires delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from a given
set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him, and these assessments are peculiarly
ones for the trier of fact”); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51721
(Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, & 249) (“While we acknowledge in the
Proposing Release that materiality judgments can be difficult, we do not believe an appropriate
answer to this difficulty is to set forth a bright-line test, or an exclusive list of ‘material’ items for
purposes of Regulation FD.”).
113. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 236. By not mandating a bright-line rule for determining the
materiality of a statement or omission, the Court utilized a subjective test. Id. This subjective test
allows courts to scrutinize different factual scenarios in order to determine the “fact-specific
finding” of materiality. Id. However, the test is not limited to a subjective component; rather, in
formulating the rule, the Court included an objective standard as well. See id. at 231–32. The
Court “expressly adopt[ed] the TSC Industries standard for materiality,” which required a
determination of whether the “reasonable investor” would deem the statement or omission “as
having significantly altered the total mix of information” available to the public. Id. at 231–32
(quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a)–(b) (2013); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,
651–52 (1997) (discussing the elements of both the classical and misappropriation theories of
insider trading).
115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b). “[A] purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is ‘on the basis
of’ material nonpublic information about that security or issuer if the person making the purchase
or sale was aware of the material nonpublic information when the person made the purchase or
sale.” Id. Congress passed Rule 10b5-1 to resolve the federal circuit splits about whether the courts
should look to either “possession” or “use” of material nonpublic information as an appropriate
standard in insider trading cases. Jennifer L. Neumann, Insider Trading: Does “Aware” Really
Resolve the “Possession” Versus “Use” Debate?, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 189, 189 (2001). The
basis for Rule 10b5-1 is found in case law. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 197 n.44 (7th Cir.
1978) (explaining that although insiders immediately selling a large portion of their stock followed
by the public disclosure of information that leads to a decrease in the company’s stock price gives
rise to the inference that the insider was acting upon the information, the inference can be negated
by a showing that the sales were consistent with past sales or occurred pursuant to a plan).
116. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c).
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they possess is not a factor in the decision to trade, such as pursuant to a preexisting plan, contract, or instruction that was made in good faith.117 However,
not all jurisdictions strictly adhere to Rule 10b5-1’s possession requirement.118
Courts must examine the necessary elements and the established precedents,
along with the specific facts of the case, to determine whether a theory of insider
trading applies. If applicable, the defendant must be found guilty of insider
trading.
II. THE CASE OF BAUER
A. Events Leading Up to Prosecution
Jilaine Bauer (Bauer) is a securities lawyer who was once employed by
Heartland Advisors, Inc. (HAI).119 HAI managed the portfolios for Heartland
Group, Inc. (HGI), which served as the underwriter and distributor of HGI’s
mutual fund shares (Funds).120 During the relevant time period, Bauer served in
various high-level company management and board positions for both HAI and
HGI.121
In 1999 and continuing through Bauer’s redemption of her shares, the Funds
experienced significant liquidity problems caused by substantial redemptions
and by a growing number of bonds in the Funds’ portfolio that either defaulted
or were placed on a possible default “watch list.”122 In addition, HAI struggled
to sell the Funds’ securities at book value, which led to further concerns
regarding the Funds’ valuation and the discussion of price reductions.123 In the
midst of these problems, one of the Fund managers tendered his resignation.124
Bauer subsequently put trading restrictions in place for all HAI personnel who
117. Id. (naming elements of the affirmative defenses to Rule 10b5-1).
118. See Audrey Strauss, Recent Insider Trading Jury Charges: ‘Possession’ vs. ‘Use’, N.Y.
L.J., July 7, 2011, at 5, 7 (explaining that Congress’ adoption of Rule 10b5-1 did not seem to resolve
the “possession” v. “use” debate). Rather, recent jury instructions in the Second Circuit have
broken away from the awareness requirement; instead, the courts have instructed juries that they
must find that the defendant actually used the information. Id.
119. SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2013). HAI is both an investment adviser and
a broker-dealer. Id.
120. Id. HGI is an open-end management investment company. Id. A mutual fund is a
collection of financial assets, primarily securities, that belongs to the individual investors who hold
ownership shares in the fund. Jones v. Harris Assoc. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2010) (citing Burks
v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979)). The Funds included the “Short Duration Fund” and the “High
Yield Fund.” Bauer, 723 F.3d at 762.
121. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 762. During this time period, Bauer served as general counsel, chief
compliance officer, senior vice president, and secretary for HAI. Id. In 2000, Bauer also served as
chairperson of HAI’s Pricing Committee. Id. She was also vice president and was elected secretary
of HGI. Id.
122. Id. at 763–64.
123. Id. at 764.
124. Id. In order to create a transition plan, the manager and the Board agreed to defer the
resignation until late September 2000. Id.
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had become aware of the tendered resignation.125 The Board and the Pricing
Committee regularly met during this time period to discuss options to deal with
the Funds’ pricing and liquidity problems.126
At the end of September 2000, HAI issued a press release announcing the
departure of the Fund manager and the hiring of a replacement.127 Bauer lifted
the previously imposed trading restrictions after informing HGI’s board, its
independent counsel, the President of both HAI and HGI, and the Vice President
and Chief Operating Officer of HAI of the Fund manager’s departure.128 A few
days later, Bauer phoned in her order to redeem all of her shares in the Short
Duration Fund for $44,627.15.129 During the phone call, Bauer identified herself
by name and stated that she was an HAI employee.130 The Funds’ problems
continued, and approximately two weeks after Bauer’s redemption, HAI
instituted widespread cuts that resulted in a drastic drop to the Funds’ net asset
values (NAVs).131 Several months later, the Funds entered receivership.132
B. Trial Proceedings
The SEC sued Bauer for insider trading and other securities law violations in
December 2003.133 In May 2011, the district court granted the SEC summary
judgment on the insider trading charges.134 Bauer appealed.135

125. Id. While serving as chief compliance officer, Bauer instituted the company’s policy
against insider trading, which prohibited HAI employees from trading in securities that the Fund
held on the basis of confidential information. Id. at 762.
126. Id. at 764–67 (tracking the meetings and reporting the discussions that took place).
127. Id. at 765.
128. Id. at 766.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 767. The “haircuts” resulted in a drop in the Short Duration Fund’s NAV by over
forty-four percent, and a drop in the High Yield Fund’s NAV by over sixty-nine percent. Id.
132. Id. Receivership is a form of bankruptcy whereby the courts or creditors appoint a
receiver to oversee the company’s bankruptcy proceedings. Receivership, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/receivership.asp (last visited June 8, 2014). The receiver
may be appointed by a court or governing body. Id. The receiver has the authority to make
decisions on behalf of the company and decides how to manage and distribute the company’s assets.
Id.
133. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 767. All of the related defendants to the case except Bauer came to an
agreement with the SEC and settled their claims out of court. Id.
134. Id. The district court granted summary judgment based on the stipulation that Bauer was
an insider in possession of confidential information when she redeemed her shares and because
there was no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the materiality and scienter elements.
Id. In September 2011, the district court dismissed all of the remaining claims originally brought
against Bauer. Id.
135. Id.
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C. The Appeal
Despite winning summary judgment by advancing the classical theory of
insider trading, the SEC changed tactics on appeal.136 The SEC dropped the
classical theory and argued only the misappropriation theory.137
The Seventh Circuit, in its opinion, acknowledged that this action was unique
because it was “one of the few instances in which the SEC has brought insider
trading claims in connection with a mutual fund redemption.”138 The court
explained that “[n]o federal court has directly opined on the applicability of
insider trading prohibitions to the trade of mutual fund shares,”139 primarily
because “the SEC has never brought a § 10(b) claim in the mutual fund
context.”140 The court went on to state several critical observations.
First, the Seventh Circuit noted that the district court did not properly
understand the uniqueness of the claims and the “threshold” legal issues.141
More specifically, the district court did not consider “whether, and to what
extent, the [classical and misappropriation] insider trading theories apply to
mutual fund redemptions.”142 Second, the court observed that although the
district court relied on the classical theory of insider trading, it “did not,
however, weigh the novelty of the SEC’s claims in the mutual fund context.”143
Third, the Seventh Circuit found that the misappropriation theory had never been
presented to the district court.144
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case for several
reasons.145 Regarding the question of whether Bauer’s conduct constituted
deception under insider trading theories, the court declined to consider the
classical theory of insider trading because the SEC failed to argue the issue on
appeal.146 With respect to the misappropriation theory, the Seventh Circuit held
136. Id. at 770. The court disagreed with the SEC’s argument that at the district court level, it
did not choose between the classical or misappropriation theory. Id. at 770 n.4. The SEC argued
that they put Bauer on notice that she could be held liable for either theory. Id.
137. Id. at 769–70.
138. Id. at 762.
139. Id. at 762.
140. Id. at 769.
141. Id. at 762.
142. Id. at 769. Based on this omission, the district court had not been called upon to categorize
Bauer’s conduct as violating either insider trading theory. Id. at 771.
143. Id. at 770. By failing to weigh the novelty of the claim, the district court did not describe
how the classical theory applied to mutual fund redemptions. Id.
144. Id. Because the district court had not been presented with an argument regarding the
application of the misappropriation theory, the Seventh Circuit had been asked to affirm summary
judgment based on a theory of insider trading that was never presented to the district court and on
a district court opinion that failed to consider whether either the classical or misappropriation theory
applies to mutual fund redemptions. Id.
145. Id. at 762.
146. Id. at 771. The court found that by not briefing the court on the classical theory, the SEC
forfeited its ability to argue the theory. Id.
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that it would be “fundamentally unfair” to deprive Bauer of the opportunity to
fully develop arguments and present evidence regarding that theory.147 Given
the novelty of the issue presented, the court further reasoned that remand was
warranted.148 Although it expressed some skepticism regarding the SEC’s
position, the court clarified that it was not denying the applicability of an insider
trading claim involving the buying and selling of mutual fund shares based on
the misappropriation theory.149
Even though the Seventh Circuit did not rule on the applicability of the
misappropriation theory, its decision to remand the case highlighted the
importance of the opinion. The court allowed the district court to opine on the
misappropriation theory first.150 By doing so, the appellate court secured the
right to review the lower court’s decison rather than serving as the sole
adjudicator of the issue and risking a final decision on such a novel issue.151
III. THE REDEMPTION OF BAUER’S MUTUAL FUND SHARES AS A VIOLATION
OF FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The policy rationales underlying the prohibitions against insider trading are
centered on the principles of fairness, efficiency, and market integrity.152 Based
on these principles, insider trading law operates to prevent fraud, manipulation,
and deception in the capital markets.153 Courts remember these policies when
deciding whether an individual’s acts constitute insider trading.154 Although the
classical and misappropriation theories, in their current form, have allowed
courts to more easily determine whether a factual scenario amounts to a violation
of insider trading, insider trading cannot be forced into a predetermined mold.155

147. Id.
148. Id. at 772. The court stated that even if the parties present the same evidence, the district
court judge should rule on the issue before the appellate court decides whether the misappropriation
theory applies. Id. at 771.
149. Id. at 772 (stating the court is seeking clarity to understand how the elements of insider
trading might arise in the mutual fund redemption context).
150. Id. at 771–72, 777 (citing the novelty of the issue among reasons for its decision to remand
the case).
151. See id. at 771, 777 (remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012) (discussing why it is necessary to regulate the securities and
exchange markets); see also Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting a policy
argument about how insider trading is unfair to other investors and should be discouraged).
153. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A
Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1169 (2003) (discussing the underlying policy reasons
for insider trading anti-fraud provisions).
154. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246–47 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that when flexibly construing the anti-fraud provisions, it is important that a court’s ruling
is consistent with the purposes of the federal securities laws).
155. See Nagy, supra note 29, at 1317–20. The Supreme Court in O’Hagan reversed twenty
years of Supreme Court precedent that took a narrow view of the federal securities laws, especially
Section 10(b). Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading
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Therefore, the courts must recognize the flexibility of the doctrine and appreciate
the underlying policy rationales when applying the current theories of insider
trading to Bauer’s factual scenario.156
A. The SEC Correctly Abandoned the Classical Theory of Insider Trading on
Appeal
Even though the SEC abandoned the classical theory on appeal, and the Court
of Appeals supported the logic of this decision,157 the impact on future cases
makes it necessary to understand why the classical theory cannot apply to the
facts of Bauer. The classical theory targets a corporate insider who breached a
duty to the corporation with which the insider traded and that corporation’s
shareholders.158 The court found Bauer to be a corporate insider, and as such,
she owed a fiduciary duty to the counterparties of the transaction.159
Under the classical theory, Bauer must have either disclosed all information
in her possession regarding the transaction to the counterparty or abstained from
trading in the Fund for the transaction to be legal and to not violate insider
trading law.160 The counterparty to Bauer’s redemption, in the transaction under
investigation, was the mutual fund itself.161 However, requiring disclosure to
Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1244–45 (1998) (discussing United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)).
156. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651 (stating that Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is not
limited to deceiving a purchaser or seller of securities, but applies to any deception “in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246–47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that
federal securities laws must be interpreted flexibly). The text of the anti-fraud provisions reflects
the expansiveness of the rules. The text prohibits “any person . . . in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security” from employing “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of” SEC rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (emphasis added). The repeated use of the word
“any” is important when applying the rules to various factual scenarios. See Affiliated Ute Citizens
of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (stating that the word “any” designates that the
anti-fraud provisions must be viewed broadly and inclusively); see also Nagy, supra note 155, at
1296 n.344 (highlighting that federal securities laws must be interpreted flexibly to cover all the
activities that Congress intended to prevent) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah, 406 U.S. at
151).
157. SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2013).
158. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52; see also supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the classical theory
of insider trading).
159. SEC v. Bauer, No. 03-C-1427, 2011 LEXIS 56780, at *36 (E.D. Wis. May 25, 2011)
(finding that Bauer qualified as an insider when she engaged in the trading activity in question),
rev’d, 723 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013). The appellate court noted that the SEC and Bauer both agreed
that at the time of the transaction in question, Bauer was an insider. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 770. At the
district court, the SEC made no attempt to expand Bauer’s role from a traditional insider of HAI,
but acting as an outsider, to HGI in her redemption of her fund shares. Id.
160. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (stating that the duty for corporate insiders
under the classical theory established by the Chiarella court).
161. See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5, SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013)
(No. 12-2860), 2012 WL 6563351, at *5 (stating that a mutual fund is the redeeming party’s
counterpart).
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the counterparty would not make sense if the counterparty knew all of the
material information because the purpose of the disclosure is to ensure that all
parties to the transaction are equally informed.162 In Bauer’s case, the executives
who ran the mutual fund had all of the material information that Bauer had in
her possession.163 Consequently, nondisclosure to the mutual fund would not
create unfairness within the transaction between the two parties.164 Bauer did
not take advantage of increased information then available to the
counterparty.165 Therefore, Bauer argued the classical theory could not be the
basis for an insider trading violation.166
Although the Court of Appeals did not rule on whether the classical theory
could apply in the mutual fund context,167 the court’s reasoning and the SEC’s
decision to abandon this theory on appeal showed that the classical theory did
not accurately apply to the facts of Bauer.168 Additionally, the SEC’s
abandonment of a theory after advancing it for twelve years illuminates the
SEC’s struggle to find a viable theory of insider trading on which to convict
Bauer.169
B. The Misappropriation Theory and Its Application to Bauer
On appeal, the SEC changed its argument to rely upon the misappropriation
theory.170 The misappropriation theory targets persons, insiders or outsiders,171
162. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *4 (Nov.
8, 1961) (recognizing the unfairness of insider trading because it allows one party to benefit based
on information that is not available to other parties).
163. See Bauer, 723 F.3d at 764–67 (stating all of the information Bauer possessed and
discussed with the Board in relation to the problems with the mutual funds).
164. Id. at 771 (stating that “the mutual fund [] is always fully informed and cannot be duped
through nondisclosure”); see also Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 161, at 5
(arguing that it would be illogical for insiders to disclose information to the mutual fund).
165. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
166. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 771 (summarizing Bauer’s reasoning against the applicability of the
classical theory). For the classical theory to better fit this transaction, the theory would need to be
expanded within the context of mutual funds to include protections for those shareholders owning
portions of the fund. If the misappropriation theory did not support remedial claims for these
shareholders, this would be an interesting expansion of the classical theory, giving it a much broader
effect. This expansion argument is similar to the argument that seeks to expand the class of
breached fiduciaries under the misappropriation theory. See Nagy, supra note 155, at 1309–10
(arguing that the misappropriation theory should not solely be based on a breach to the source of
the information, but rather a breach to all securities holders of the company holding the
information).
167. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 771 (declining to examine whether the classical theory applies because
the SEC did not raise the issue in its briefs).
168. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
169. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 770–71.
170. Id. at 771; see also Brief of the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Appellee at 29, SEC v. Bauer, 723
F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-2860), 2012 WL 6018890, at *29.
171. The misappropriation theory is commonly phrased to target corporate outsiders. See
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1997) (stating that “the misappropriation theory
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who misuse confidential information within the context of trading securities “in
breach of a duty . . . owed to the source of the information.”172 In remanding the
case, the Court of Appeals did not rule out the applicability of the
misappropriation theory.173 The misappropriation theory’s broad scope can be
applied to hold Bauer liable under insider trading law for redeeming her
shares.174
Bauer does not initially appear to be an outsider and does not fit the class of
persons commonly found guilty under the misappropriation theory.175 Based on
this fact alone, the misappropriation theory should not apply to Bauer.176
However, as stated in Dirks, theories of insider trading can expand to fit
individuals with a particular status into a theory of insider trading.177 As such,
the misappropriation theory should not be discounted solely because the court
found Bauer to be a corporate insider.178
In order to determine whether the misappropriation theory applies to Bauer’s
transaction, the court must judge whether Bauer’s redemption of the Fund shares
violates the purpose of this theory.179 The misappropriation theory is designed
to “protect the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by outsiders”
who owe a duty to the source of the information and not the shareholders.180
Because the duty is to the source of the information, disclosure to the source of
the information prevents deception.181 Without deception, no fraud exists and
outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate ‘outsider’”). However, the
theory is not limited in this sense. Rather, the use of “outsiders” is meant to reflect the
misappropriation theory’s contrasting and much broader application than the classical theory. See
Nagy, supra note 155, at 1307–10 (highlighting the breadth of the misappropriation theory’s
possible interpretations).
172. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
173. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 772. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals highlighted the questionable
conduct of Bauer, and through the remand, invited the SEC to introduce the misappropriation theory
to the district court rather than have the appellate court issue a ruling on a theory that had not been
applied and adjudicated in the case at hand. Id. at 772–73.
174. See infra notes 197–205 and accompanying text (discussing why the misappropriation
theory can be applied to Bauer).
175. See Bauer, 723 F.3d at 772 (remarking upon the intense level of involvement that
investment advisors have with the funds they manage).
176. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (discussing how the misappropriation theory applies to
corporate outsiders who do not owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders).
177. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
178. There has been debate concerning the definition of fraud in the insider trading context.
See Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 514–17 (2011) (highlighting
the uncertainty about when fraud applies to securities law). However, if fraud is seemingly
apparent, the exact status or title of a person should not shield her from liability.
179. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53 (describing the circumstances to which the
misappropriations theory applies).
180. Id. at 653 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing an insider’s duty to
disclose or abstain from trading when the insider possesses confidential information, so that the
insider does not breach the insider’s fiduciary duty).
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one cannot be held liable for insider trading.182 Here, Bauer identified herself as
an HAI employee by name during her redemption.183 Bauer disclosed her
identity over the phone to an operator, but did not inform the Board of her
intention to redeem all of her shares.184 Because the Board is the source of the
information, Bauer would need to disclose to the Board in order to prevent
deception.185 Under this analysis, it appears that Bauer’s redemption of her
shares breached her duty to the mutual fund.186 Therefore, the misappropriation
theory should apply to Bauer’s actions.187
182. See Laura D. Mruk, The Proverbial Axe to the Judicial Oak: The Impact of Stoneridge on
Plaintiff’s Actions Under § 10(b), 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 281, 297 (2009) (stating that at common
law, on which section 10(b) is based, deception was broad enough to include misleading conduct
and the act of concealing information).
183. See supra note 132–33 and accompanying text.
184. SEC v. Bauer, 723 F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 2013) (describing the phone call Bauer made
to redeem her shares and not describing any actions Bauer took to tell the Board of her redemption).
185. The Board is the source of the information, because the Board maintained all of the
discussions regarding the various problems affecting the mutual fund. See id. at 764–67 (describing
the Board’s meetings to address the Fund’s problems).
186. Because Bauer became aware of the material information through the Board, the
information is to be used solely by the Board to manage and price the Funds and not for the personal
benefit of one of the Board members. See id. (describing how Bauer came into contact with the
information through the Board); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653–54 (1997)
(explaining the company’s nonpublic information is the type of property over which a company
has exclusive rights).
187. It should also be noted that if it is determined that the classical and the misappropriation
theories cannot be applied to convict Bauer of insider trading, the SEC is not limited to the current
theories of insider trading. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. Rather, these theories were
developed as various ways to interpret the anti-fraud provisions. See Thomsen, supra note 2
(explaining that court interpretations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have had a significant impact
in shaping and changing the contours of insider trading). As witnessed in O’Hagan, the courts may
endorse new theories based on the arguments advanced. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653–54; see also
FERRARA, supra note 7, at § 2.02 [7] (discussing a third theory of insider trading accepted by the
Second Circuit that based liability on acquiring material nonpublic information by fraudulent
means). However, in the past, the Court has found limitations when interpreting the anti-fraud
provisions. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980) (stating that although
Section 10(b) may be viewed broadly, it is limited to prosecuting fraud consistent with the statute’s
language and purpose) (quoting Toche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)); see
also Thomsen, supra note 2 (highlighting the flexibility of insider trading while acknowledging the
limits of existing law and the importance of new laws in society). The Court endorsed the
misappropriation theory in O’Hagan because the issue in question involved the statutorily required
deceptive conduct “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at
659. To successfully advance a new theory, the SEC would have to argue a theory that would
encompass the necessary elements. See supra Parts I.C.1-3 (defining the elements of insider
trading); see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234–35 (refusing to apply a new theory of liability that did
not meet the necessary elements established by Section 10(b)). The theory would also have to
advance the principals established originally in Cady, Roberts and followed subsequently by the
Court in Chiarella. The two elements from Cady, Roberts for establishing a Rule 10b-5 violation
are: “(i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take
advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.” Id. at 227.
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C. The Necessary Elements of Insider Trading Exist in Bauer
1. The Redemption Was “on the Basis of” Nonpublic Information
Rule 10b5-1 establishes that trading meets this required element if the person
was aware of the information when the trading occurred.188 In Bauer’s case,
Bauer was aware of the Fund’s liquidity and management struggles.189
Therefore, the fact pattern satisfies this element, unless Bauer can claim an
affirmative defense or exception to the rule.190 Bauer moved to nullify the
inference of insider trading by attempting to justify her redemption on various
factors, including a planned move to California pursuant to new employment
and a personal struggle with the volatility of the Fund.191 If the court accepted
these reasons as true, Bauer’s redemption could qualify for an exception.192
However, the court would not likely reach this conclusion given the timing of
the redemption and the fact that Bauer had yet to be offered a job in California.193
2. The Information Traded on Is Material
Any claim of insider trading must involve the defendant trading on material
information.194 Here, Bauer failed to divulge her knowledge of the management
and liquidity struggles of the Fund.195 Although this fact is no doubt material,
“[a]n insider of an open-end fund generally would not be able to exploit insider
information . . . because an open-end fund is required to price its shares . . . at
NAV.”196 This means that the mutual fund must be priced daily in order to

188. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5–1(b) (2013).
189. See Bauer, 723 F.3d at 769 (stating that Bauer attended a board meeting, where the board
discussed the Funds’ problems); see also supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
190. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5–1(c) (outlining affirmative defenses that individuals may use to
avoid liability).
191. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 161, at 20, 2012 WL 6563351, at *20.
192. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5–1(c)(1)(i)–(ii) (explaining the circumstances that alleviate
liability from trading “on the basis” of certain information).
193. Brief of Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Appellee, supra note 170, at 47–49, 2012 WL 6018890,
at *47–49.
194. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 768–69 (citing SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d
Cir. 1999) (stating that the SEC must prove that Bauer made a material misrepresentation or
omission)).
195. See Bauer, 723 F.3d at 766 (describing Bauer’s knowledge of the Funds’ problems, but
saying nothing about Bauer disclosing this knowledge).
196. Select Sector SPDR Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 3, 1999 WL 185555, at *3 (May 6,
1999). NAV stands for “net asset value.” See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (describing redemption
based on net asset value); see also Mercer E. Bullard, Insider Trading in Mutual Funds, 84 OR. L.
REV. 821, 824-25 (2005).
When calculating a fund’s net asset value, its portfolio securities must be valued, if
‘market quotations are readily available,’ at their current market value. If market
quotations are not readily available, portfolio securities must be valued based on their
‘fair value as determined in good faith by the [fund’s] board of directors.’ Funds choose
the time or times of day as of which they price their shares, but in practice, virtually all
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reflect all available information to the pricing committee.197 Therefore, Bauer
cannot be held liable for insider trading under either theory, unless she knew that
the Funds were mispriced.198
However, Bauer and the Board knew that the Fund’s problems would continue
to result in redemptions.199 There would be no drastic change in price, until these
redemptions actually occurred.200 By possessing this information, Bauer was
able to redeem her personal shares before the other customers in the Fund
redeemed their shares, thus saving her roughly $20,000.201 In light of these
circumstances, the information that Bauer possessed was likely to be considered
material.202
3. Bauer Acted with Scienter
The court must assess whether Bauer had the intent to deceive, or in other
words, whether she knew what she was doing, in order to determine if she acted
with the necessary level of scienter.203 As stated in O’Hagan, full disclosure
removes the finding of scienter.204 Bauer did not fully disclose, but she could
not have intended to deceive the Fund because the Board approved removing the
restriction on trading for HAI employees.205 As the trading window was open,
Bauer did nothing wrong in doing what all HAI employees had permission to

funds price their shares once a day as of 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time. Fund shares
must be sold by the funds and their distributors at their per share NAV, and there is no
secondary market for fund shares. This means that all fund sales and redemptions occur
at their per share NAV.
Id. at 824–25 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 17 C.F.R. 270.2a-4(a)(1) (2005)).
197. Bullard, supra note 196, at 824–25.
198. Bauer did not discuss information with the Funds’ pricing services or participate in
valuation discussions. SEC v. Bauer, No.03-C-1427, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56780, at *11–12
(E.D. Wis. May 25, 2011). Instead, Bauer notified the Board about the pricing service’s concerns
about the Funds’ NAV, but had difficulty assigning the securities a fair value. Id. at *25–26.
However, in the end, the pricing committee decided to use the third party pricing services valuations
because such valuations appeared to represent the fair value of the securities. Id. at *26–27.
199. Brief of Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Appellee, supra note 170, at 35–36, 2012 WL 6018890,
at *35–36 (quoting Bauer’s email to the Board positing that liquidation may be the only answer to
the Fund’s continuing problems).
200. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 766–67 (describing the Fund’s problems and the decision to suspend
redemptions).
201. See id. at 767 (discussing the changing in share prices and Bauer’s redemption of her
shares before sending an email to make the information public).
202. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the element of materiality).
203. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the element of scienter).
204. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 474, 476 (1977)) (distinguishing the facts under the misappropriation theory with another
case that found no liability because the defendants had publicly disclosed all material information
and, therefore did not violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s provisions requiring deception).
205. Bauer, 723 F.3d at 766, 771 (citing Bauer’s email encouraging HAI to disclose).

2014]

If the Glove Fits, It's Insider Trading

1099

do.206 When she redeemed her shares, she identified herself.207 On their face,
her actions do not appear to have the intention to deceive.208
However, with recklessness available as the threshold to prove scienter,209 the
SEC is more likely to establish this element “so long as they can persuade the
fact-finder of the defendant’s greedy character or disposition.”210 In Bauer, this
approach appears to be a reasonable objective for the SEC. The SEC should be
able to paint the picture of Bauer as a greedy executive by focusing on the fact
that Bauer redeemed her shares while in possession of material information, and
that she saved herself $20,000 at the expense of other holders of the Fund.211
IV. CONCLUSION
Although SEC v. Bauer brought forth the novel issue of whether insider
trading applies in the mutual fund context, the court cannot constrict its view of
insider trading so narrowly as to discount Bauer’s conduct. As this Note
explains, the misappropriation theory applies to Bauer, and her actions fit the
required elements of insider trading. However, an important fact-specific
question remains because scienter is arguably proved under the standard of
recklessness. On remand, the district court should accept the misappropriation
theory as applicable to Bauer, but should allow a jury to determine the question
of fact regarding whether she acted with the requisite level of scienter. By
allowing the misappropriation theory to apply to mutual fund share redemptions,
the court will ensure that an entire class of investment vehicles is afforded the
same protections against insider trading as more traditional investment
opportunities, such as stock purchases. As the financial investment world
continues to diversify and evolve, it is essential that protections exist to
encourage investment and to promote the integrity of the markets.

206. Id. at 771.
207. Id. at 766.
208. See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 159, at 18–20, 2012 WL 6563351, at
*18–20 (arguing that the trading window was open, that she had personal reasons to redeem her
shares in the mutual fund, and that these reasons were not based on an intent to deceive her
employer or the mutual fund).
209. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
210. Langevoort, supra note 95, at 5 (putting the burden of persuading a jury of greed on the
prosecution).
211. See Brief of Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Appellee, supra note 170, at 34, 2012 WL 6018890,
at *34 (describing how Bauer’s position allowed her to profit unfairly at the expense of investors).
In its brief, the SEC focused on the timing of Bauer’s redemption. See id. at 21–24 (recounting
Bauer’s actions leading up to her redemption). The Commission also alerted the court to the fact
that Bauer was a securities lawyer who devised the insider trading policies for HAI. Id. at 51. As
such, of all of the corporate executives, Bauer should have understood that her conduct could
constitute insider trading, and that she should be held to an even higher standard. Id.
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